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Abstract: We present a stylized model of the over-the-counter (OTC) markets in the
tradition of Du¢ e, Gârleanu, and Pedersen [10] with three distinctive features: (i) Buyers
willingness to pay is private information. (ii) Dividends depend on the state of the macro
economy. (iii) Sellers become nancially distressed if they cannot sell for too long. Unlike
the existing body of work in this literature the probability of trade is endogenous, which
in turn opens the door to many interesting results, such as liquidation sales, predation and
boom and bust cycles.
Keywords: re sales, predation, liquidity, boom and bust cycles
JEL: D8, G1
1 Introduction
Participants in over the counter (OTC) markets face two types of frictions. One is searching
for a counterpart and the other is, once the counterpart is found, whether the parties can agree
on the terms of trade. A recent literature, spurred by the inuential work of Du¢ e, Gârleanu,
and Pedersen [10]1 captures the former friction, but not the second. In these models trade
materializes as soon as agents contact each other. In reality, however, it is not uncommon at
all for parties to walk away without trading; disagreement, in fact, is the more likely outcome.
With the advancing communication technology the former friction (searching for a counter-
part) is a secondary concern. For instance nowadays sellers can package the necessary docu-
mentation of a contract, such as a term sheet, detailed long form conrmation, an Excel pricing
sheet, into an iPhone or Android app enabling potential buyers to download and browse the
content using their smart phones. If interested, the app allows them to contact the seller for
further details.2 The key friction, therefore, is the latter that is, whether the buyer wants to
purchase or not. This in turn depends on whether the asset is indeed what the buyer is looking
for.
Many investors, for instance, participate in OTC derivatives markets for hedging purposes.
Investors face di¤erent types and levels of risk and therefore need di¤erent types of contracts
1See Afonso [1], Lagos and Rocheteau [16], Rocheteau and Weill [20] or Vayanos and Wang [22] among others.
2See http://derivatrust.com/index.html. Electronic trading platforms, such as OTCBB or OTC Link coupled
with instant messaging capabilities also make it easy to contact sellers.
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to cover their exposure. The idiosyncrasy in buyersneeds implies that an asset that turns out
to be a good t for a particular buyer may be a poor t for another. The buyer nds out these
details only after meeting the seller and discussing the underlying structure of the asset. To
capture this idea we assume that the dividend of an asset consists of two parts; a deterministic
and aggregate component that is the same across all assets plus an idiosyncratic component that
determines how good a t the asset is for the potential buyers needs. The buyer realizes the
quality of the t after linking up with the seller and the realization is his private information.
The idiosyncrasy in dividends implies that, unlike the existing literature, the probability
of trade is endogenous.3 In equilibrium buyers follow a threshold rule. If the quality of t is
su¢ ciently high then the deal goes through, otherwise buyers walk away. The aggregate yield,
too, a¤ects the probability of trade. As it grows large the deal becomes more lucrative and
buyers pay less attention to the goodness of t because the opportunity cost of not buying kicks
in. When the aggregate part grows beyond a smaller threshold distressed trades materialize for
sure (they are cheap) and if it exceeds a higher threshold all trades, distressed or regular, go
through with probability 1 whether the t is good or bad.
As hinted above, the likelihood of trade as well as other equilibrium objects depend on
whether sellers are distressed or not, which brings us to the second component of the model
the fact that sellers may become desperate if they cannot sell for too long. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that sellers may become nancially distressed due to, for instance, pressing debt oblig-
ations, nearing margin calls, hedging motives, being caught in a short squeeze etc. This notion
is captured by an adverse shock, which, if hits, causes sellers to grow impatient and makes
them more eager to o¤-load their holdings. We show that in equilibrium nancially distressed
sellers pursue liquidation sales (or re sales): they quote prices that are substantially below
fundamental values and consequently trade faster.
Liquidation sales are associated with signicant prot losses, but more importantly they open
the door for predation. We show that during periods where sellers are more likely to encounter
nancial distress (e.g. crises or recessions) the followings occur. First, the number of re sales
rises. Second, all sellers, regular and distressed, quote lower prices. And most importantly,
third, customers exhibit what we call predatory buying : they become more selective and hold o¤
purchasing despite the abundance of distressed sales and lower prices. By doing so customers
strategically slow down the speed of trade causing the percentage of desperate sellers to grow
further. This, in turn, exerts more pressure on sellers forcing them for further price cuts. This
cycle dries up liquidity and increases the cost of liquidation for distressed sellers. Indeed, from
a distressed sellers point of view, liquidity disappears when it is mostly needed.
Though it lacks an agreed upon denition in the literature, predation is a prevalent feature
of nancial markets. Anecdotal evidence is abound documenting numerous forms of predatory
trading.4 Based on these observations, a recent body of theoretical work explores various
mechanisms through which predation takes place. For instance in Attari et al. [2] predators
lend to the nancially fragile preys in an e¤ort to obtain higher prots by trading against
them for a prolonged time. In Brunnermeier and Pedersen [5] if a distressed trader is forced to
3 In the aforementioned body of work all assets yield identical returns. As long as there are gains from trade
(there always is) the deal goes through, which is why trade is automatic contingent on the meeting.
4E.g. see Brunnermeier and Pedersen [5] (pp. 1853-4) or Carlin et al.[8].
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liquidate, other strategic traders initially sell in the same direction driving down the price even
faster and then buy back at dirt cheap prices. Carlin et al. [8] describe an equilibrium where
cooperation among traders breaks down leading to predatory trading and episodic illiquidity.5
Our model contributes to this literature by providing yet another mechanism through which
predation manifests itself: Investors deliberately hold o¤purchasing, which raises the percentage
of distressed sellers in the market, which in turn leads to further price cuts.
The state of the macro-economy, too, a¤ects the equilibrium objects. The aggregate yield is
the same across all assets and takes two values; xh if the economy is in the high state and xl if
it is in the low state. A high state is a period where fundamentals are strong, so all assets yield
greater returns. A low state corresponds to the opposite scenario. We analytically show that
the market goes through boom and bust cycles as the macro economy switches between high
and low states. In the high state prices rise and trade speeds (boom) up while in the low state
prices fall and trade slows down (bust). The reason is this. Assuming states are su¢ ciently
persistent, purchasing the asset in the high state is more lucrative than purchasing it in the low
state. This is why buyers accept higher prices in the high state. On the other hand, sellers have
no means of transferring the extra value across states, so they have strong incentives to trade
while the asset is still valuable. Therefore they limit the price rise to a modest amount making
sure that trade indeed speeds up in the high state.
There is an interesting interplay between the changing market conditions and the demo-
graphics of agents. We show that during boom episodes the number of owners rises while the
number of sellers shrinks. The percentage of distressed sellers, too, shrinks during booms. The
opposite happens during busts. The change in demographics is a natural outcome of the previ-
ous result. The increased speed of trade in a boom means that more sellers trade and become
buyers while at the same time more buyers purchase and become owners; hence the pendulum
tilts towards owners and away from sellers. In addition if trade speeds up then sellers quickly
trade and exit before becoming distressed, which is why the percentage of distressed sellers falls.
The model naturally suggests two proxies of liquidity, the rst of which is the probability
of trade and the second is the prot loss in a liquidation sale. We discuss how these measures
respond to the parameters of interest. Curiously, though, the proxies almost always point to
the opposite directions and disagree whether liquidity improves or worsens when a parameter
changes. This is, perhaps, not too surprising since these proxies, by construction, quantify
di¤erent aspects of liquidity; however it is clear that one cannot rely on a single measure to
fully apprehend liquidity. The contradictory nature of the proxies may also explain why in the
literature there seems to be no denition of liquidity that is generally agreed upon (Lagos [13]).
2 Model
The model specication is a variation of Du¢ e, Gârleanu, and Pedersen [10]. We consider a
continuous-time economy with a xed supply a > 0 of indivisible assets that yield a ow of
dividends q.6 Investors are risk neutral and divided into four categories; buyers, non-trading
5See also Coval and Sta¤ord [9], Morris and Shin [17], Pritsker [18], Pulvino [19], Shleifer and Vishny [21]
among others.
6For a model where the asset is divisible and agentsholdings are unrestricted see Lagos and Rocheteau [16].
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owners, regular sellers and distressed sellers. Similar to [10] we have a closed loop setting
where no agent leaves the market and there is no entry from outside; specically the total
measure of agents  is xed and exceeds a: Each buyer wants to purchase one unit of the asset
to consume its dividends. After trading buyers become owners and remain so until they are hit
by a liquidity shock which turns them into regular sellers. The shock arrives with a Poisson
rate  and reduces the ow value of dividends from q to zero, which is why sellers wish to trade
and liquidate their holdings.7 Once the asset has been sold, the seller comes back to the market
as a buyer (see the owchart in Figure 1).
If regular sellers cannot trade for too long then they may become distressed. This notion is
captured by another idiosyncratic adverse shock, which, too, arrives at an exogenous Poisson
rate  > 0: The shock is similar in nature to the liquidity shock above and may be associated
with factors such as pressing debt obligations, margin calls from other positions etc. Such
di¢ culties are more likely to arise during nancial crises or recessions, so it is sensible to think
that  rises during such periods. Buyers and regular sellers have the same discount factor  > 0
whereas distressed sellers are more impatient and discount future utility with  > : A larger
value of  implies a more severe shock.
The dividend q = xs + v consists of an aggregate component xs plus an idiosyncratic com-
ponent v. The aggregate component xs is same across all assets and takes two values; xh if the
economy is in the high state and xl if it is in the low state, where xh > xl. In the high state
fundamentals are strong and all assets yield greater returns. The opposite is true in the low
state. The transition is according to a rst order Markov process, where
Pr (xt+1 = xsjxt = xs) = , where s = h; l:
The parameter  governs persistence and we assume that  > 1=2 i.e. if the economy is in state
s today, then it is likely to remain in the same state tomorrow. All agents know xh, xl and :
The di¤erence between xh and xl lters its way into buyersand sellersvalue functions and it
is the main reason behind the boom and bust cycle result in Section 5.
The idiosyncratic component v 2 [0; 1] is a random draw from the unit interval via the cdf
F:8 As pointed out in the introduction buyers di¤er in terms of their tastes and preferences, so
the realization of v determines how good a t the asset is for the buyers liking. A high value
of v indicates a good t and a low value indicates a poor t. We assume that v is independent
across buyers, so the same asset may be liked by one investor and disliked by another. From a
buyers perspective the search process amounts to nding a high enough v: Unlike the aggregate
component xs the value of v does not change over time; once an asset is purchased the buyer
enjoys the same v forever. At this point it may seem that the aggregate component xs plays no
role in determining the probability of trade, however this is not true. As it turns out, if xs is
su¢ ciently large then buyers do not pay any attention to the goodness of t; all meetings result
in trade even if v turns out to be zero. We impose the following assumption on F:9
7The liquidity shock in the literature is typically associated with hedging needs arising from a position in
another market; see, for instance, [10], [16] or [22].
8This is a standard technique to accommodate preference heterogeneity among buyers; see for instance Jo-
vanovic [12], Wolinsky [24], among others.
9Log-concavity is a mild assumption. Many distributions including Uniform, Normal, Exponential, 2 satisfy
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 Assumption 1. The survival function  = 1  F is log-concave, i.e.
f2 (v) + f 0 (v)  (v) > 0; 8v:
The valuation v is a buyers private information. The seller cannot observe v; he only knows
the cdf F and the state of the economy. He cannot tailor the price for each customer; so he
must quote the same take-it-or-leave-it price p for all customers. The pricing mechanism in
the aforementioned papers, and mostly in reality, is bargaining.10 Modelling bargaining in a
complete information setting is straightforward; however with private information this becomes
a non-trivial task as disagreement, delay, multiple or a continuum of equilibria are common
in such models; see Kennan and Wilson [14]. To analytically characterize the equilibrium we
assume that the transaction necessarily takes place at the initially quoted price.
The market is characterized by trading frictions and operates via search and matching.
There are two sources of frictions in the model:
1. Locating and meeting a trading partner. Trading partners are matched over time bilat-
erally. We assume that agents meet each other according to a Poisson process with xed
search intensity  > 0. The arrival rate of a trading partner is proportional to the mea-
sure of the partners group. Specically, a buyer meets a distressed seller at rate ms;d
and regular sellers at rate ms;r where ms;d and ms;r denote the steady state measures
of distressed and regular sellers in state s = h; l: A seller, on the other hand meets buyers
at rate ms;b; where ms;b is the measure of buyers.11
2. The second friction is, whether the asset, once located, turns out to be a good t for the
potential buyer. The model is based on private information, so unlike models of complete
information, meetings do not necessarily result in trade. The probability of trade s;j is
endogenous and depends on the sellers type j as well as the state of the economy s. With
some abuse of notation, we denote the probability of trade as well as the survival function
with ; because, as it turns out, the probability of trade s;j equals to  (vs;j) where vs;j
is an threshold below which no trade takes place (see below)
As pointed out in the introduction, the key friction is the latter and it is behind most of the
results in the paper.
this property; see Bagnoli and Bergstrom [3].
10 Inter-dealer trading systems allow dealers to post and disseminate their prices to the market place. The two
major systems are OTC Link and FINRAs OTCBB. The former system is equipped with electronic messaging
and allows dealers to negotiate but OTCBB is a quotation only system.
11Du¢ e and Sun [11] present a formal proof of this argument. See also Vayanos and Wang [22].
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3 Analysis
3.1 Steady State Measures
The asset is in xed supply a, so the measures of agents in possession of the asset (owners +
regular sellers + distressed sellers) add up to a; that is
ms;o +ms;r +ms;d = a: (1)
The total measure of agents  is also xed and exceeds a: It follows that the steady state measure
of buyers, too, is xed and equals to
ms;b =    a > 0:
Without loss in generality x ms;b = 1 so that  equals to 1+a: Remaining measures ms;o; ms;r
and ms;d are endogenous and are determined by the fact that in steady state the inow into a
group of investors equals to the outow from it. Similar to Du¢ e et al. [10], we have a closed
loop setup in the sense that no agent ever leaves the market and there is no inow from outside.
Unlike [10], though, buyers in our model are not subject to the liquidity shock.
Fig 1 - Flow Chart
Consider desperate sellers. The inow ms;r consists of regular sellers hit by the adverse shock.
The outow ms;ds;d comprises of sellers who trade and become buyers.12 Setting inow equal
to outow yields
ms;ds;d = ms;r: (2)
12A distressed seller meets a buyer at rate ms;b and trades with probability s;d hence the total ow is
ms;bms;ds;d: Recall that ms;b = 1:
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Now consider regular sellers. The inow ms;o consists of owners hit by the liquidity shock.
The outow has two components: ms;rs;r which are regular sellers who trade and become
buyers plus ms;r which are regular sellers who become desperate. Therefore
ms;o = ms;rs;r + ms;r: (3)
Proposition 1 Equations (1), (2) and (3) pin down the steady state measures ms;o; ms;d and
ms;r as follows:
ms;d = afs;df1 + s;rg+ s;d + 1g 1;
ms;o = ms;d  s;df1 + s;rg;
ms;r = ms;d  s;d:
(4)
The measures depend on exogenous parameters ; a;  and  as well as the probabilities of
trade s;j which are endogenous and controlled by buyers.13 As we show later, distressed sellers
trade at lower prices; so ceteris paribus, buyers wish to encounter such sellers more often. Since
buyers control the probabilities they can make this happen. To see how, focus on the fraction
of distressed sellers in the market
s
:
=
ms;d
ms;d +ms;r
=
1
1 + s;d
: (5)
Note that  increases if the probability of trade s;d falls: Indeed if buyers squeeze s;d then
distressed sellers cannot trade fast enough; their lingering presence in the market slows down
the outow from the pool of distressedand increases . As it turns out, the rising  intensies
the competition among distressed sellers forcing them for further price cuts. This is the basic
mechanism behind predation result in section 4.1.
3.2 Owners
Letting  s denote the value function of an owner in state s, we have
 s = v + Exs + fEs;r    sg;
where
Exs = xs + (1  )x~s and Es;r = s;r + (1  )~s;r: (6)
13The following table summarizes the signs of the partial derivatives of the measures with respect to the
parameters of interest (the algebra is skipped):
  s;d s;r
ms;d + + - -
ms;r + - + -
ms;o - + + +
A rise in the arrival rate of the liquidity shock  turns more owners into sellers, so ms;d and ms;r rise while ms;o
falls: Similarly a rise in the arrival rate of the adverse shock  causes more relaxed sellers to become distressed;
hence ms;r falls while ms;d goes up. The e¤ect of  on the measure of owners ms;o is more subtle. The rising
 increases the fraction of distressed sellers, and, as we show later, distressed sellers trade faster than regular
sellers; so trade speeds up. This, in turn, means that more buyers become owners, hence ms;o goes up. Using
similar arguments, and the owchart, one can explain the signs wrt s;j :
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An owner keeps enjoying the idiosyncratic dividend v plus the expected value of the aggregate
dividend Exs until he is hit by the liquidity shock , which turns him into a regular seller, whose
value function in state s is denoted by s;r. Rearranging yields
 s =
v + Exs + Es;r
 + 
; (7)
Note that the expectations are conditional on the state. The expression Exh is the expected value
of the aggregate yield contingent on purchasing the asset in the high state; other expectations
are likewise. One can show that Exh > Exl if  > 1=2: In addition, below we show that Eh;r
is greater than El;r. So, controlling for the idiosyncratic dividend v; the function  h exceeds
 l; that is, being an owner is more valuable in the high state than it is in the low state. As
pointed out earlier, this di¤erence is the main reason behind the boom and bust cycles.
3.3 Buyers
Now turn to buyers. Letting 
s denote their value function in state s we have

s =

1 + 
 fms;rIs;r + ms;dIs;d + (1  ms;r   ms;d) 
sg
+
1  
1 + 
 fms;rI~s;r + ms;dI~s;d + (1  ms;r   ms;d)
~sg;
where
Is;j =
Z 1
0
max f s (v)  ps;j ;
sg dF (v) .
The expression Is;j is the expected surplus to a buyer contingent on having met a type j
seller in state s: As long as the di¤erence  s (v)   ps;j exceeds the opportunity cost 
s the
buyer purchases, otherwise he walks away. With this information the interpretation of 
s is
straightforward: With probability  the current state s persists; at rate ms;r the buyer meets
a regular seller and obtains Is;r and similarly at rate ms;d he meets a distressed seller and
obtains Is;d. In case the buyer does not meet a trading partner, he continues to enjoy 
s:With
probability 1  the state switches to ~s and the remainder of the expression can be interpreted
similarly. Observe, however, that at the time the state switches from s to ~s; the measures are
still ms;r and ms;d:
For any given price ps;j we conjecture an associated threshold (or reservation value) vs;j
satisfying
ps;j +
s =  s (vs;j)
i.e. leaving the buyer indi¤erent between buying and searching: After substituting for  s the
indi¤erence condition becomes
ps;j +
s =
vs;j + Exs + Es;r
 + 
: (8)
Buyers decision is simple: purchase if v  vs;j and keep searching otherwise. Clearly the
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probability of trade s;j is endogenous and equals to
s;j = Pr (v  vs;j) =  (vs;j) ;
where  = 1 F is the survival function. As mentioned earlier, not all meetings result in trade;
for trade to occur the asset has to be a good match for the buyer. Substitute  s from (7) into
Is;j and use the indi¤erence condition (8) to obtain
Is;j =
Z 1
vs;j
v   vs;r
 + 
dF (v) =
Z 1
vs;j
 (v) dv
 + 
:
In the second step we have used integration by parts. Now focus on the expression for 
s:
Straightforward algebra yields

s = kms;rEIs;r + kms;dEIs;d + (1  k)m~s;rEI~s;r + (1  k)m~s;dEI~s;d; (9)
where
k =
1  + 
2  2+  and EIs;j = Is;j + (1  ) I~s;j : (10)
Note that k is a constant between 0.5 and 1, so the function 
s is a weighted average of the
expected consumer surpluses in both states. The weight k exceeds 0.5 and rises in ; i.e. the
current state s has a greater weight in 
s and its weight gets bigger as the state becomes more
persistent.
3.4 Sellers
Sellersvalue functions, denoted by s;j , are given by
s;d = Xs;d + (1  )X~s;d (11)
s;r =  [Xs;r +  (s;d  s;r)] + (1  ) [X~s;r + (~s;d  ~s;r)];
where
Xs;j =  (vs;j) (ps;j +
s  s;j) : (12)
The expression Xs;j is the expected net surplus to a type j seller in state s. The seller encounters
a buyer at rate  and the buyer purchases with probability  (vs;j). If trade occurs the seller
obtains price ps;j plus 
s (he becomes a buyer now) minus s;j (he is no longer a seller): With
this information it is easy to interpret s;d and s;r: Note that a regular seller keeps track of
the state of the economy as well as the possibility of becoming distressed in each state, whereas
a distressed seller worries only about the state of the economy because he is already distressed
and will remain so until he sells.
The function s;r is linked to several contingencies; straightforward algebra yields:
( + )s;r = c1Xs;r + (1  c1)X~s;r + c2

Xs;d +
 (1  c2)

X~s;d; (13)
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where
c1 =
+  (2  1)
 +  (2  1) and c2 = 1  + c1 (2  1)
are constants in the unit interval (given that  > 1=2):
A type j seller in state s solves
max
ps;j2R+
s;j s.t. vs;j = ( + ) (ps;j +
s)  Exs   Es;r
taking 
s as given.14 The function s;j is a weighted average of Xs;j at di¤erent nodes; so, the
optimal price ps;j must, by the Bellman principle, maximize the net surplus Xs;j . The FOC,
thus, is given by15
ps;j +
s  s;j = (vs;j)
( + ) f (vs;j)
; 8s; j: (14)
It is easy to verify the second order condition;16 thus the solution above corresponds a maximum.
Inserting the FOC into (12) yields
Xs;j =
2 (vs;j)
( + ) f (vs;j)
; 8s; j:
Substituting this into (11) and (13) yields closed form expressions of the value functions s;d
and s;r when sellers optimize. Now we can dene the equilibrium.
Denition 2 A steady-state symmetric equilibrium is characterized by value functions  s; 
s;
s;d; s;r given by (7), (9), (11), (13) and the pair v = fvs;jg 2 [0; 1]4 and p = fps;jg 2 R4+
satisfying indi¤erence (8) and prot maximization (14). The steady state measures ms;d;m

s;r
and ms;o; also implicitly part of the equilibrium, can be recovered from (4) by substituting s;j =
(vs;j):
Combine the indi¤erence conditions in (8) with FOCs (14) to obtain
s;j
:
= (vs;j) =f (vs;j) + ( + )s;j   Exs   Es;r   vs;j = 0 for all s; j: (15)
Existence of an equilibrium amounts to showing that there exists some v 2 [0; 1]4 satisfying
(15): However there are four equilibrium conditions all of which are non linear in v; so it is
not practical to attempt to prove existence and analytically characterize the equilibrium for the
full-edged model. Instead we take the following route.
14From the sellers point of view, cutting the price directly improves the buyers willingness to trade, but the
seller fails to take into account how this drop changes equilibrium prices and the buyers value of search; see [7].
15Alternatively one can directly di¤erentiate the value functions s;d and s;r wrt the prices. One still gets
the same FOCs, but inevitably the algebra is more cumbersome.
16We have
X
00
s;j =   ( + )

f 0 (vs;j) ( + ) fps;j +
s  s;jg+ 2f (vs;j)
	
:
Substitute the FOC (and omit the argument vs;j) to obtain
X
00
s;j =   ( + )

f 0+ 2f2
	
=f:
The expression is negative because of log concavity.
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The model has two major components: (i) sellers become desperate as they are unable to
sell and (ii) the economy switches between high and low states. In the next section we ignore
the second component and assume that the economy remains in the same state forever. Then,
in section 5 we take the opposite approach; we focus on the economys transition between high
and low states assuming that no seller becomes distressed. These simplications allow us to
obtain several key results analytically. In section 6 we return to the full edged model.
4 Liquidation Sales and Predation
Let  = 1 so that the economy remains in the same state s forever (absorbing Markov state).
Equations in (15) simplify to
r (vr; vd) =  (vr) =f (vr) + r   x  vr = 0 and (16)
d (vr; vd) =  (vd) =f (vd) + ( + )d   r   x  vd = 0; (17)
Now, we have two, instead of four, equations to analyze and note that throughout this section
we dispense with the state index s.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium exists and it is unique. In equilibrium distressed sellers pursue
liquidation sales; they accept to trade at lower prices and consequently sell faster, i.e. pd < p

r
and d > 

r :
In the proof we show that the locus of r = 0 is downward sloping (wrt vr) whereas the
locus of d = 0 is upward sloping; so, they intersect once in the vr   vd space (as seen in panel
2c), which implies that there exists a unique v satisfying (16) and (17).
More importantly, the equilibrium is characterized by liquidation sales (or re sales). After
being hit by the adverse shock a distressed seller grows impatient and quotes a lower price in
an e¤ort to quickly exit from his position. The price-cut produces the desired outcome. The
inequality d > 

r says that distressed trades materialize faster than regular trades.
Attempting a liquidation sale, of course, is costly. Had the seller not become distressed he
would have traded at pr (the "fundamental value") but the shock forces him to trade at the
lower price pd; so the di¤erence is the forgone prots incurred in the liquidation process. The
ratio  = (pr   pd) =pr the prot loss as a percentage of the fundamental value therefore is
a natural proxy for liquidity. The higher , the more costly the liquidation, and therefore the
lower the liquidity. In section 7 we discuss how  responds to the key parameters of the model.
Liquidation sales are prevalent in nancial markets (e.g. see Coval and Sta¤ord [9] or Shleifer
and Vishny [21]) and occur for a variety of reasons including paying regulatory nes, meeting
margin calls or other pressing debt obligations all of which are summarized in the adverse
shock in our model.17 Furthermore liquidation sales typically come with spill-over e¤ects onto
regular sales (Shleifer and Vishny [21]) and may trigger predatory buying. We touch upon these
issues below.
17Real asset markets, too, exhibit re sales. Pulvino [19] nds that commercial airplanes sold by distressed
airlines brings 10 to 20 percent lower prices when compared to planes sold by undistressed regular airlines. See
also Campbell et al. [6] for a discussion about foreclosures and re sales in the real estate market.
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4.1 Predation
Proposition 4 If the adverse shock arrives more often, i.e. if  rises, then the equilibrium
price pd falls yet the probability of trade 

d decreases. Buyers deliberately delay purchasing
from desperate sellers despite the falling prices. This behavior (labelled as predation) further
increases the percentage of desperate sellers.
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It is sensible to think that  increases during nancial crises or recessions where an increasing
number of sellers encounter nancial distress. The proposition says that during such times
distressed sellers o¤er further price cuts, yet buyers are reluctant to purchase. The mechanism
behind the result is this. An increase in  causes sellersand buyersvalue functions to move in
opposite directions; sellers are worse o¤ and buyers are better o¤. Specically, the fraction of
desperate sellers, ; rises with ; and intensies the competition for distressed sellers. Realizing
that many other sellers are in the same dire situation, distressed sellers are forced to cut their
already low prices. The question is whether price cuts generate the desired outcome and the
answer is no. The probability of trade d falls, instead of rising. To understand why note that
distressed sales come with greater consumer surplus; so the rising  boosts buyers value of
search. Realizing that there are plenty of good deals in the market buyers hold o¤ purchasing
and search longer, i.e. they lower d: This response has the following feedback e¤ect, which is
what we label as predation. By lowering d buyers strategically slow down the speed of trade
and cause  to grow further. The growing , in turn, puts additional downward pressure on
prices and so on.
The arguments can be seen in Figure 2. The solid lines in panels 2a and 2b are the true
values of  and pd, whereas the dashed lines are what they would have been had the probabilities
of trade remained intact, so that the change in  and pd would be purely for exogenous reasons;
namely the rising :18 In both gures the di¤erence between the two lines is due to predation.
Anecdotal evidence is abound documenting numerous forms of predatory behavior in -
nancial markets19. Inspired by these observations, a recent body of theoretical work explores
mechanisms through which predation takes place e.g. see Attari et al. [2], Brunnermeier and
18The dashed lines are obtained by xing d = 0:89 and 

r = 0:59 which are the equilibrium values when
 = 0:05: This is why in both simulations the solid and dashed lines start at the same point when  = 0:05:
19See for instance Brunnermeier and Pedersen [5] (pp. 1853-4), Carlin et al.[8] or Shleifer and Vishny [21].
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Pedersen [5] or Carlin et al. [8] (in the introduction we briey discuss these papers). Our model
contributes to this literature by illustrating a new scheme through which predation manifests
itself.
4.2 Probability of Trade and the Aggregate Yield
We now explore the link between the aggregate yield x and the probability of trade. As seen
above, from a buyers point of view the search process amounts to nding a high enough v since
all assets yield the same deterministic x. So, it may appear that the aggregate yield x plays no
role in determining the probability of trade; however this is not true. As we show next buyers
pay little or no attention to v if x is large enough.
Proposition 5 Both r and d rise in x. Furthermore
r < d < 1 if 0 < x < x
+
r < d = 1 if x
+  x < x++
r = d = 1 if x
++  x;
where x+ and x++ are thresholds given by (22) and (27).
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If x is small then the goodness of t v has considerable weight in determining whether the
deal goes through or not. Indeed if x < x+ then no meeting automatically results in trade; even
distressed sellers face some uncertainty about whether or not the transaction will take place.
However as x grows large buyers pay less attention to v as the opportunity cost of not buying
starts to weigh in, which is why both r and d rise in x. When x grows beyond x
+ distressed
trades materialize for sure (they are cheap) and when it exceeds x++ all trades, distressed or
otherwise, go through for sure. See Figure 3a for an illustration.
Figures 3b is also easy to interpret. Realizing buyerseagerness to purchase, sellers reect
the rise in x onto their prices, which is why both pr and pd are upward sloping. Once x grows
beyond x+ the probability d hits 1 and distressed sellersFOC no longer holds with equality
(prices coming out of the FOC produce probabilities in excess of 1) so they set prices simply
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to satisfy d = 1: This is why p

d start to grow faster and catches up with p

r after x
+: Once x
goes above x++; regular sellers, too, resort to the corner outcome and set prices to implement
r = 1:
Figure 3c says that the measure of owners mo grows large while the measures of sellers, mr
and md; shrink with x: This stems from the rising probabilities. Indeed if trade speeds up, then
a large number of sellers trade and become buyers, while at the same time the same number of
buyers trade and become owners; hence the outcome.
5 Boom and Bust Cycles
In this section we shut down the channel whereby sellers become distressed (specically we let
 = 0) and assume that all sellers are regular. The key feature that we want to highlight,
instead, is the economys transition between high and low states and how that transition a¤ects
the equilibrium objects.
Proposition 6 Fix  = 0: The equilibrium prices and the probabilities of sale are high in the
high state and low in the low state i.e. ph > p

l and 

h > 

l :
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The proposition says that the market booms in the high state (prices are high, expected
time to sale is short and the trade volume is high) and goes bust in the low state (prices are
low, expected time to sale is long and the trade volume is low). The intuition is this. The asset
generates higher returns in the high state, so controlling for the probability of trade, buyers
are ready to pay more. Alternatively, controlling for prices, they are more eager to purchase.
Realizing this, sellers increase prices in the high state; however they limit the price rise to a
modest amount. This is because they cannot transfer the additional value across states, so they
have strong incentives to trade while the asset is still valuable. By limiting the price increase
to a small amount they ensure that buyers are indeed more likely to purchase in the high state.
14
For an illustration see panels 4a and 4b, where equilibrium objects are plotted against the
persistence parameter . Clearly we have ph > p

l and 

h > 

l : Note that a rising  exacerbates
the price and probability gaps across states; so, transitional uctuations are most severe if   1
and less pronounced if   1=2:
6 Simulations
Now we turn to the full edged model and provide some sensitivity analysis via numerical
simulations. We assume that the asset is in total supply a = 1. It pays xh = 1 in the high state
and xl = 0 in the low state while the idiosyncratic dividend v is uniformly distributed in [0; 1].
The persistence parameter  is set to 0:8; so a state, on average, persists for 5 periods. The
arrival rate of the liquidity shock  equals to 0.3; hence the expected duration of ownership is
3.33 periods. The adverse shock arrives at rate  = 0:4. All agents, except distressed sellers,
have time preferences with discount rate  = 0:1; whereas distressed sellers are more impatient
and have  = 0:3: Finally the search intensity  equals to 1.
v  U (0; 1) xh = 1 xl = 0  = 0:8 a = 1
 = 0:3  = 0:4  = 0:1  = 0:3  = 1
Figures 5, 6 and 7 plot equilibrium objects against the parameters of interest ;  and :
 Observation 1. The results about liquidation sales and boom and bust cycles obtain in
the full edged model.
Panels a and b in Figures 5; 6 and 7 show that p;r > p;d and 
;r > ;d, which means
that in either state of the economy distressed sellers trade at lower prices and sell faster. The
gures also reveal that ph; > p

l; and 

h; > 

l;; i.e. controlling for sellerstypes, prices and
probabilities are high in the high state and low in the low state. Altogether the observations
suggest that the analytic results in Propositions 4 and 6 (liquidation sales and boom and bust
cycles) go through in the full edged model.
 Observation 2. In a booming market the number of owners rises while the number of
sellers shrinks. The percentage of distressed sellers, too, shrinks in booms. The opposite
happens in a market that goes bust.
Panel c in Figures 5; 6 and 7 illustrates the measure of owners mh;o and ml;o in either state
of the economy. From this one can deduce the total measure of sellers (regular + distressed)
because the asset is in xed supply a = 1; thus owners plus sellers add up to 1. So, if one
measure goes up then the other goes down. Instead of plotting sellersmeasures ml;r, mh;r,
ml;d and mh;d separately (the graph becomes too crowded) we simply plot the percentage of
desperate sellers h and l in either state of the economy.
The simulations in 5c, 6c and 7c reveal that mh;o > ml;o and h < l, conrming the claim
made in the observation. The inequalities follow from the fact that trade is more likely in
the high state. The increased speed of trade means that in the high state more sellers trade
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and become buyers while at the same time more buyers purchase and become owners; hence
mh;o > ml;o: In addition when trade speeds up sellers quickly trade and exit before becoming
distressed, which is why h < l:
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 Observation 3. The predation result obtains in the full model.
Figure 5 provides a broader picture of the predation result. An increase in  has three
consequences. First, more sellers become distressed and attempt liquidation sales; see the rising
percentage of distressed sales in panel 5c. Second, all sellers, regular and distressed, trade at
lower prices (panel 5a). Third, customers are reluctant to purchase. Despite the rising number
of distressed sales and falling prices, the probability of trade either remains almost at or, in
fact, falls (panel 5b).
We have already discussed the mechanism behind predation, but there is a point to add
here. Regular sellers, too, are worse o¤ because of the rising . Facing an increasing prospect of
becoming distressed in the future, they signicantly reduce their prices in an e¤ort to quickly sell
before being hit by the shock; see the falling p:;r in 5a. This is the spillover e¤ect of distressed
sales onto the regular sales. The di¤erence between p;r and p;d vanishes as  grows large, which
implies that regular sellers, in fact, cut prices more dramatically than distressed sellers.20
20Distressed sellers are not afraid of becoming distressed anymore; indeed their value function s;d does not
contain . Regular sellers, on the other hand, are afraid of becoming distressed (their value function s;r
decreases in ) hence the e¤ect of  is more pronounced on regular sellers. This is why p;r falls sharper than p

;d:
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 Observation 4. As  rises, i.e. as the shock becomes more biting, all prices fall, trade
speeds up and the percentage of distressed sales falls.
Recall that , by assumption, must exceed ; which is why it starts from  = 0:1 in the
simulation. A rise in  makes desperate sellers even more impatient. Regular sellers, too, are
a¤ected by the rising  as they face a grimmer outlook if they were to become distressed one
day. Hence all asset prices drop, but the fall in p;d is sharper than the one in p
;r (observe that
the price di¤erence is minimum when   ; but gets bigger as  rises):
The severity of the shock, unlike its frequency , does not change the percentage of distressed
sales.21 So, from a buyers perspective, the number of deals stays the same but the deals get
sweeter because of the lower prices. Consequently buyers increase the probabilities to catch
these deals; as seen in panel 6b. The increased speed of trade raises the number of owners and
decreases the percentage of distressed sellers (panel 6c). Note that the rise in m;o or the fall in
 is due to the changing probabilities, not due to  itself.
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 Observation 5. A rise in the arrival rate of the liquidity shock  increases the number of
21 Indeed @s=@ = 0, i.e. ceteris paribus  is una¤ected by  (one can immediately verify this from (5)).
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sellers, which intensies the competition among them sending prices down and increasing
the speed of trade.
When  rises more owners are hit by the liquidity shock and become sellers (see the falling
m;o in 7c): The increased number of sellers intensies the competition, which is why prices
come down (panel 7a). The sharp fall in prices leads to higher probabilities of trade (panel 7b)
hence trade speeds up. The increased speed of trade means that sellers quickly trade and exit
before becoming distressed, which is why the percentage of distressed sales  falls (panel 7c).
7 Cost of liquidation Sales and Liquidity
As pointed out by Lagos [13], in nancial economics a market is considered to be liquid if
traders can nd a counterpart relatively quickly, and if the cost of trading is relatively small.
The model naturally suggests two equilibrium objects measuring these two aspects. The rst
is the probability of trade s;j which proxies the ease of transacting in the market (this is
what Brunnermeier and Pedersen [5] refer as "market liquidity"). The higher the probability,
the quicker the trade, the larger the volume, and therefore the higher the liquidity. We have
already discussed how s;j responds to the key parameters of the model.
The second proxy
s =
ps;r   ps;d
ps;r
; s = h; l;
is a distressed sellers percentage-wise prot loss. Had the seller not become distressed he would
have obtained ps;r; but in a liquidation he can only obtain ps;d; so the di¤erence p

s;r   ps;d is
the forgone prots. The index s is, therefore, the percentage-wise loss taking the regular price
as a benchmark. Higher values of s indicate that liquidation sales are costly and therefore the
market is illiquid. Below we analyze how s responds to key parameters of the model.
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 Observation 6. In either state s falls in  and rises in  and : Attempting a liquidation
sale is generally more costly in the low state.
Panel 8a illustrates the prot loss s as a declining function of . When the shock is
infrequent (  0) distressed sales take place about 10% below regular sales, however when the
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shock is rather frequent (  2) the di¤erence is about 5%. This is because, as discussed earlier,
regular sellers are more sensitive to  than distressed sellers are (distressed sellers do not worry
about  as much because they are already distressed). So, although both prices fall; the drop
in pr is sharper than the one in pd which is why s declines. The declining s, indicates that
liquidity improves because distressed sales are less costly. However one has to be careful when
interpreting this rather positive-looking result, because the improvement is only relative. In
absolute terms all sellers are worse o¤ (all prices fall). Only in relative terms distressed sellers
are better o¤.
Panel 8b shows that s rises with : If the shock is mild (  ) then there is not much
di¤erence between what regular and distressed sellers charge, however as the shock starts to bite
(  ), then distressed sellers face considerable losses; for instance when   1 (corresponding
to a discount factor 50%) the price di¤erence exceeds 25%. The reason is that distressed sellers
are directly a¤ected by  (it is their own discount factor) whereas regular sellers worry about
 in case they become distressed one day; hence pd falls more sharply than p

r ; which is why s
goes up: So, from a prot loss perspective liquidity worsens with :
Finally, panel 8c plots the prot loss against the liquidity shock. A rise in  turns more
owners into sellers which intensies the competition and brings down the prices. Although both
prices fall, pd falls sharper than p

r ; which is why s goes up.
 Observation 7. The proxies s and s;j almost never agree whether liquidity improves
or declines.
The table below summarizes and compares how s and s;j respond to the key parameters
of the model.
Prot Loss s Probability of Trade s;j
Falls in ; liquidity improves vs. Falls in  (or stays at); liquidity drops
Rises in ; liquidity worsens vs. Rises in ; liquidity improves
Rises in ; liquidity drops vs. Rises in ; liquidity improves
Interestingly the proxies almost always point to opposite directions and never agree whether
liquidity improves or worsens. This outcome, perhaps, is not too surprising since the proxies,
by construction, capture di¤erent aspects of liquidity; however it is clear that one cannot rely
on a single measure to fully apprehend liquidity. The contradictory nature of the proxies may
be a reason why in the literature there seems to be no denition of liquidity that is generally
agreed upon (Lagos [13]).
The proxies agree, though, that liquidity worsens when the economy goes bust. Simulations
in Figure 8 show that l generally exceeds h indicating that liquidation sales are more costly in
the low state. Furthermore, Proposition 6 along with Observation 1 indicate that trade is less
likely is in the low state. Taken together, both proxies say that liquidity drops as the market
transitions into a bust episode.
19
7.1 Conclusion
This paper contributes to a recent literature, spurred by Du¢ e et al. [10], studying the OTC
markets via search and matching. We complement this literature by assuming that buyers
willingness to pay is private information, that sellers are heterogeneous in terms of their urgency
to sell and that asset returns exhibit state dependence. Unlike the existing body of work in
this literature the probability of trade is endogenous, which in turn opens the door to many
interesting results, such as liquidation sales, predation and boom and bust cycles.
20
References
[1] Afonso, G., 2011. Liquidity and congestion. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 20(3),
pp.324360.
[2] Attari, Mukarram, Antonio Mello, and Martin Ruckes, 2005, Arbitraging arbitrageurs,
Journal of Finance 60, 24712511
[3] Bagnoli, M., and Bergstrom, T., 2005. Log-concave Probability and Its Applications. Eco-
nomic Theory 26, 445-469
[4] Brunnermeier, M.K. & Pedersen, L.H., 2005. Predatory Trading. The Journal of Finance,
60(4), 1825-1863.
[5] Brunnermeier, M.K. & Pedersen, L.H., 2009. Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity.
Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), pp.22012238.
[6] Campbell, J.Y., Giglio, S. & Pathak, P., 2011. Forced Sales and House Prices. American
Economic Review, 101(5), pp.21082131.
[7] Camera, G., Selcuk, C., 2009. Price Dispersion with Directed Search. Journal of the Euro-
pean Economic Association, 1193-1224
[8] Carlin, B.I., Lobo, M.S. & Viswanathan, S., 2007. Episodic Liquidity Crises: Cooperative
and Predatory Trading. The Journal of Finance, 62(5), pp.22352274.
[9] Coval, J. & Sta¤ord, E., 2007. Asset re sales (and purchases) in equity markets. Journal
of Financial Economics, 86(2), 479-512.
[10] Du¢ e, D., Gârleanu, N. & Pedersen, L.H., 2005. Over-the-Counter Markets. Econometrica,
73(6), 1815-1847.
[11] Du¢ e, D. and Y. Sun (2007). Existence of independent random matching. Annals of Ap-
plied Probability 17 (1), 386 - 419.
[12] Jovanovic, B., 1979. Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover. Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 87: 972-90.
[13] Lagos, R., 2008. The Research Agenda: Ricardo Lagos on Liquidity and the Search Theory
of Money. EconomicDynamics Newsletter 10.
[14] Kennan, J., & Wilson, R., 1993. Bargaining with Private Information. Journal of Economic
Literature, 31(1), 45-104
[15] Lagos, R., Rocheteau, G. & Weill, P.-O., 2011. Crises and liquidity in over-the-counter
markets. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(6), pp.21692205.
[16] Lagos, R. & Rocheteau, G., 2009. Liquidity in Asset Markets With Search Frictions. Econo-
metrica, 77(2), pp.403426.
21
[17] Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2004) Liquidity Black HolesReview of Finance, 8, 1-18.
[18] Pritsker, M., 2009. Large Investors: Implications for Equilibrium Asset, Returns, Shock
Absorption, and Liquidity. SSRN eLibrary
[19] Pulvino, T.C., 1998. Do Asset Fire Sales Exist? An Empirical Investigation of Commercial
Aircraft Transactions. The Journal of Finance, 53(3), 939-978.
[20] Rocheteau, G. & Weill, P., 2011. Liquidity in Frictional Asset Markets. Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, 43, pp.261282.
[21] Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R., 2011. Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 25(1), pp.2948.
[22] Vayanos, D. & Wang, T., 2007. Search and endogenous concentration of liquidity in asset
markets. Journal of Economic Theory, 136(1), 66-104.
[23] Weill, P., 2008. Liquidity premia in dynamic bargaining markets. Journal of Economic
Theory, 140(1), 66-96.
[24] Wolinsky, A., 1988. Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding. Review of Economic
Studies 55, 71-84.
22
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof involves three steps.
Step 0. Preliminaries. To start, substitute  = 1 into the expression for s;d and s;r; given
by given by (11) and (13), to obtain
d =

(+)
 2(vd)f(vd) and r =

(+)(+) 
h
2(vr)
f(vr)
+ 
2(vd)
f(vd)
i
: (18)
The following partial derivatives will be useful
@d
@vd
=  (vd)
(+)
 2f2(vd)+f 0(vd)(vd)
f2(vd)
and @r@vd =

+  @d@vd ;
@r
@vr
=   (vr)(+)(+)  2f
2(vr)+f 0(vr)(vr)
f2(vr)
and @d@vr = 0:
All partial derivatives (except for @d@vr ) are negative because of log concavity.
Step 1. Existence-. We will show that the locus of r = 0 and that of d = 0 intersect once
in vr   vd space, where r and d are given by (16) and (17). To start, let
r (vr)
:
= fvd 2 [0; 1] j r (vr; vd) = 0g
be the locus of r (vr; vd) : Similarly let d (vr) be the locus of d: We will establish that r
is downward sloping whereas d is upward sloping wrt vr: Di¤erentiating (16) and (17) wrt vr
and vd we have:
@r
@vr
=  f2(vr)+f 0(vr)(vr)
f2(vr)
+  @r@vr   1 < 0 @r@vd = 
@r
@vd
< 0
@d
@vd
=  f2(vd)+f 0(vd)(vd)
f2(vd)
+ ( + ) @d@vd   
@r
@vd
  1 < 0 @d@vr =   @r@vr > 0
(19)
Focus on @r@vr : The rst term and
@r
@vr
are both negative because of log concavity; hence @r@vr < 0:
Similarly @r@vd < 0 since
@r
@vd
is negative. Therefore r (vr; vd) = 0 denes vd = r (vr) as an
implicit function of vr (Implicit Function Theorem) with
dr
dvr
=  @r=@vr
@r=@vd
< 0;
i.e. the locus of r = 0 is downward sloping wrt vr: Similarly one can verify that
@d
@vd
< 0 and
@d
@vr
> 0; therefore
dd
dvr
=  @d=@vr
@d=@vd
> 0;
which means that the locus of d = 0 is upward sloping.
Now we prove that r (0) > d (0) and r (1) < d (1) : Start by substituting (vr; vd) =
(0; 0) into r and d and observe that r (0; 0) > d (0; 0) because  > : In addition note
that @d@vd <
@r
@vd
< 0 (this follows from log-concavity and that @d@vd <
@r
@vd
). It follows that
r (0; vd) > d (0; vd) for all vd > 0: This, in turn, implies that r (0) > d (0). Similarly
(vr; vd) = (0; 0) into r and d and observe that r (0; 0) = d (0; 0) =   (1 + x) : Since
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@d
@vd
< @r@vd < 0 we have r (1; vd) < d (1; vd) for all vd < 1: This inequality implies that
r (1) < d (1).
Since (i) drdvr < 0 and
dd
dvr
> 0; (ii) r (0) > d (0) and (iii) r (1) < d (1) ;the Intermediate
Value Theorem guarantees existence of a unique vr 2 (0; 1) such that r (vr) = d (vr) = vd.
Step 2. Liquidation Sales-. First we will show that vd < v

r ; which, in turn, implies that
 (vd) >  (v

r) : Recall that
@r
@vr
< 0 and @d@vr > 0; hence the di¤erence r  d decreases in
vr: Now, by contradiction suppose that vr = vd = v and notice that
r (v; v) d (v; v) = r (v; v) d (v; v) = 
2(v)( )
f(v)(+)
> 0:
The expression is positive because  > : The fact that r (v; v) > d (v; v) implies that
vr 6= vd because in equilibrium we must have r (vr ; vd) = d (vr ; vd) : The inequality gets
worse if vd > v

r because r   d decreases in vr; the equilibrium condition can be satised
only if vd < v

r :
The inequality pr > pd is follows from the indi¤erence conditions (8) implying
pr   pd = (vr   vd) = ( + ) > 0;
which is positive because vd < v

r : 
Proof of Proposition 4. Recall that vr and vd simultaneously satisfy
r (v

r ; v

d) = 0 and d (v

r ; v

d) = 0:
Omit the superscript  when understood and note that (General Implicit Function Theorem)
dvj
du =
detBj(u)
detA ; for u = ; x; ;  and j = r; d;
where
Br (u) =
"
 @r@u @r@vd
 @d@u @d@vd
#
; Bd (u) =
"
@r
@vr
 @r@u
@d
@vr
 @d@u
#
; A =
"
@r
@vr
@r
@vd
@d
@vr
@d
@vd
#
:
Note that
detA = @r@vr
( )
@d
@vd
( )
  @d@vr
(+)
@r
@vd
( )
> 0:
The signs of the partial derivatives follow from the proof of the previous proposition; see (19).
It follows that
sign (dvj=du) = sign (detBj (u)) ;
where
detBr (u) =
@r
@vd
@d
@u   @d@vd
@r
@u and detBd (u) =
@d
@vr
@r
@u   @r@vr
@d
@u : (20)
The setup is general and it can be used to analyze the signs of the partial derivatives of vr and
vd wrt any one of the parameters ; x; ; ; but this proposition is about the sign of v

d wrt ;
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so below we focus on detBd (). The next proof deals with other scenarios and builds on this
setup.
To start, note that
@d
@ =   @r@ and @r@ =  @r@ ;
where
@r
@ =   (+)(+)2

2(vr)
f(vr)
  

2(vd)
f(vd)

(+)
:
Note that @r@ is negative, because the expression in the square brackets (call it T1) is positive.
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Now, substitute @d@vr and
@d
@vd
, which are given in (19), into detBd () to obtain
detBd () =   +  @r@
( )
 2f2(vr)+f 0(vr)(vr)
f2(vr)
(+)
> 0:
The last expression is positive because of log concavity. We have already established that
@r=@ is negative; hence detBd () is positive, which implies that dvd=d is positive, which
in turn implies that the equilibrium probability of sale  (vd) falls in :
Now we will show that pd; too, falls in : Use the FOC (14) and the expression for d; given
by (18), to obtain
pd +
 =
(vd)
(+)f(vd)
h
1 + 

 (vd)
i
:
Call the expression on the right hand side T2 and notice that
dpd
d =
@T2
vd
( )
dvd
d
(+)
  d
d
(+)
:
It is easy to verify that @T2vd
is negative because of log-concavity; dv

d
d is positive from above. In
addition d
d > 0.
23 Hence dp

d
d is negative. 
Proof of Proposition 5. The rst part of the proposition deals with the signs of  (vr)
and  (vd) wrt x: Recall that
sign
 
dvj=du

= sign (detBj (u)) for j = r; d
where det (Br (u)) and det (Bd (u)) are given by (20). Below we show that detBr (x) and
22To see why combine the FOCs, given by (14), with the value functions d and r, given by (18), to obtain
pr   pd = (v

r)
f(vr)(+)
  (v

d)
f(vd)(+)
+ 
(+)(+)
 T1 > 0:
This expression is positive since we have established that in equilibrium pr > p

d: Now focus on the rst two
terms on the right hand side. The expression  (v) =f (v) falls in v because of log concavity. Since vr > v

d in
equilibrium, it follows that the summation of the rst two terms is negative. This means that, for pr > p

d to
hold T1 must be positive. Hence @r=@ is negative.
23Note that

0 / m0r
Z
vr
S (v) dv +m0d
Z
vd
S (v) dv:
In equilibrium
R
vr
S (v) dv <
R
vd
S (v) dv since vd < vr(Proposition 3). One can verify that jm0dj < m0d; hence 
0
is positive.
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detBd (x) are both negative. Note that
@d
@x =
@r
@x =   1+ :
It follows that
detBr (x) =
1
+
h
@d
@vd
  @r@vd
i
< 0
detBd (x) =
1
+
h
@r
@vr
  @d@vr
i
< 0
In the rst line, the expression in square brackets is negative because @d@vd <
@r
@vd
< 0; see the
proof of Proposition 3. The expression in the second line is negative because @r@vr < 0 and
@d
@vr
> 0: The signs of the determinants imply that both vr and vd fall and therefore  (v

r) and
 (vd) rise in x:
Characterization of Corner Solutions. Let v+r be the specic value of vr satisfying
2(v+r )
(+)f(v+r )
+
(v+r )
f(v+r )
  v+r   1f(0)
h
1 + 
(+)
i
= 0: (21)
Basic algebra reveals that if x = x+, where
x+
:
=
(1+=)
(+)f(0)   +

v+r  
(v+r )
f(v+r )

; (22)
then r (v+r ; 0) = d (v
+
r ; 0) = 0; hence the the pair v
 = (v+r ; 0) correspond to an equilibrium.
Recall that vr and vd both fall in x: So, if x > x
+ then vd falls below 0; implying that the
probability of trade  (vd) exceeds 1, which, of course, is impossible. In this parameter region,
distressed sellersFOC no longer holds with equality, since the price satisfying FOC (14) and
the indi¤erence condition (8) corresponds to a probability of trade in excess of 1. The concavity
of sellers objective function implies that in this parameter region distressed sellers pick the
price pd satisfying vd = 0 (not the FOC) and the indi¤erence condition. More specically, pd
satises
x+r
+ = pd +
; (23)
where the equation is obtained by substituting vd = 0 and  = 1 into the indi¤erence condition
(8). Substitute (23) and vd = 0,  = 1 into distressed sellers value function d; given by (11),
to obtain
d =
(x+r)
(+)(+)
:
Relaxed sellersproblem is still the same. We conjecture that (to be veried below) their FOC
pr +
 r = (vr)(+)f(vr) (24)
holds with equality. Substitute (24) along with d from above (and vd = 0,  = 1) into r;
given by (13), to obtain
r =
c32(vr)(+)
f(vr)
+ c3x (25)
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where
c3 =

( + )
 
+ 

( + )   1 2 (0; 1) :
Relaxed sellers face the indi¤erence condition
vr+x+r
+ = pr +
: (26)
Combine the indi¤erence condition with their FOC (24) above to obtain
r (vr) =
(vr)
f(vr)
+ r   vr   x = 0:
This function, of course, looks similar to the equilibrium condition in (16), but unlike the former,
this one does not depend on vd anymore (now r is a function of vr only). Substitute r from
(25) into r to obtain
r (vr) =
(vr)
f(vr)
+
c32(vr)(+)
f(vr)
  vr   xc3 ( + )


 
+ 

+ 

= 0:
It is easy to verify that r falls in vr (assuming log-concavity). In addition r (1) < 0: So if
r (0) > 0 then there exits an interior vr 2 (0; 1) satisfying r (vr) = 0: Note that
r (0) > 0, x < x++;
where
x++
:
=
(+)f(+)(+)+g 
f(0)(+)f(+)+g : (27)
Therefore if x < x++ relaxed sellersFOC holds with equality and the optimal vr is interior;
hence  (vr) < 1: If, however, x  x++ then, relaxed sellers, too, set pr satisfying vr = 0 and
their indi¤erence condition (26). In this parameter region both  (vd) and  (v

r) are equal to
1. The value functions and other equilibrium objects can be obtained using the steps above. 
Proof of Proposition 6.
Step 0. Preliminaries-. Substitute  = 0 into (15) to obtain
h (vh; vl) =  (vh) =f (vh) + ( + )h   vh   Exh   Eh;
l (vh; vl) =  (vl) =f (vl) + ( + )l   vl   Exl   El;
where
s =
2(vs)
(+)f(vs)
+ (1 )
2(ves)
(+)f(ves) ; s = h; l: (28)
Recall that in equilibrium we need h = l = 0: The steady state measures of agents can be
obtained from (4) by taking the limit ! 0. We have
ms;d = 0, ms;o =
a(vs)=
(vs)=+1
; ms;r =
a
(vs)=+1
: (29)
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Buyersvalue function 
s simplies to

s = kms;rEIs;r + (1  k)m~s;rEI~s;r; (30)
since ms;d = m~s;d = 0 (in this version of the model there are no distressed sellers).
Step 1. We show that l  h increases in vh: We have
l  h = (vl)f(vl)  
(vh)
f(vh)
+ [2 (1  ) + ] (l  h)  (2  1) (xl   xh) :
Di¤erentiation wrt vh yields:
@(l h)
@vh
= f
2(vh)+f
0(vh)(vh)
f2(vh)
+ [2 (1  ) + ]

@l
@vh
  @h@vh

+ 1:
The rst expression is positive. The second expression, too, is positive if @ (l  h) =@vh is
positive. Note that
l  h = (2 1)
2(vl)
(+)f(vl)
  (2 1)2(vh)(+)f(vh) :
Therefore:
@(l h)
@vh
= (2 1)(+)   (vh) 2f
2(vh)+f
0(vh)(vh)
f2(vh)
: (31)
The expression is positive, again, because of log concavity. Hence l  h increases in vh:
Step 2. To show  (vh) >  (v

l ) we need to demonstrate that v

h < v

l : By contradiction,
suppose that vh = v

l = v: Then
l (v; v) h (v; v) = (2  1) (xh   xl) :
The expression is positive because xh > xl; which is a contradiction, since in equilibrium
l = h = 0: This means that vh 6= vl ; so either vh > vl or vh < vl : Recall that l   h
increases in vh; thus the inequality gets worse if vh > v

l : The equality l = h = 0 is possible
only if vh < v

l :
Step 3. Now we show that ph > p

l : A rst step is to show that p

h  pl decreases in vh: The
FOC (14) implies
ph   pl = h  l + (vh)(+)f(vh)  
(vl)
(+)f(vl)
  
h +
l: (32)
Di¤erentiation wrt vh to yields:
@(ph pl )
@vh
=
@ (h  l)
@vh
  @ (
h   
l)
@vh| {z }
G1
  f2(vh)+f 0(vh)(vh)
f2(vh)
:
The last expression is positive because of log-concavity; so @ (ph   pl ) =@vh is negative if G1 is
negative.
The expression @ (h  l) =@vh is given by (31) and it is negative, but @ (
h   
l) =@vh
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needs some work. We have
(+)
(2k 1)  (
h   
l) = fmh;r   (1  )ml;rg
R 1
vh
 (v) dv
+ f(1  )mh;r   ml;rg
R 1
vl
 (v) dv
where k is a constant given by (10) and recall that k > 1=2. Therefore
(+)
(2k 1)  @(
h 
l)@vh =  fmh;r   (1  )ml;rg (vh) +G2;
where
G2
:
= m0h;rf
R 1
vh
 (v) dv + (1  ) R 1vl  (v) dvg:
Observe that mh;r is given by (29) and its partial derivative wrt vh equals to
m0h;r =
a
 f (vh) = [ (vs) = + 1]
2 > 0;
hence G2 is positive. Now, substitute @ (h  l) =@vh, given by (31), and the expression of
@ (
h   
l) =@vh into G1 and re-arrange to obtain
(+)
 G1 =   (vh)G3   (2k   1)G2;
where
G3
:
= (2  1)
h
1 + f
2(vh)+f
0(vh)(vh)
f2(vh)
i
+ (2k   1)
h
a


(vl)+1
  a

(vh)+1
i
:
The term G2 is positive, so G1 is negative if G3 is positive, so focus on G3: The expression
inside the rst square brackets in G3 is positive because of log-concavity. The expression in the
second square brackets is positive since  (vl) <  (vh) (from Step 2). The terms 2   1 and
2k   1; too, are positive since  > 1=2: Hence G3 is positive, so G1 is negative and therefore
@ (ph   pl ) =@vh is negative:
Step 4. Now we can argue that ph > p

l : Fix v

l and note that if v

h = v

l then h = l (see
28) and 
h = 
l (see 30) and therefore ph = p

l (see 32). Since p

h pl decreases in vh and since
vh < v

l in equilibrium (Step 2), it follows that p

h > p

l :
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